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Abstract: Taiwan in the late 80s and Spain in the second half of 
the 70s are two examples of gradual drive from an authoritarian 
regime to a democratic system. In both cases, political transi-
tion was the long-term result of high economic growth and rapid 
social change achieved in the previous decades. Another analogy 
is that the trend toward democracy was initiated and stimulated 
from within the authoritarian regime, with no major break in the 
statu quo. 
But there are also important differences between the 
two processes. Firstly, their economic record during the tran-
sition was opposite: Taiwan's successful adjustment to the new 
international environment contrasts sharply with Spain's struc-
tural crisis, which lasted until 1984. Secondly, the mili tary and 
the ultra-rightist force s played a much less significant politi-
cal role in Taiwan. And, thirdly, in spite of better economic 
conditions and less conservative pressures, Taiwan's transition 
to democracy, since the lifting of martial law in 1987, has been 
slower than Spain's process in the period from Franco's death.in 
November 1975 to the first free general elections in June 1977. 
Although the differences between the two cases can not 
be overlooked, Spain's experience, which has proved to be, in 
historical perspective, very successful, could provide some ins-
piration for Taiwan's forward trend toward democracy (most nota-
bly, the importance of poli tical consensus and of adecuate treat-
ment of labor issues). Spain's case also highlights that the pro-
longation of authoritarianism and the internal dissents in the 
rUling party could intensify economic problems and even jeopar-
dize the transition toward democracy. 
Pablo Bustelo, PhD, is Associate Professor of Economics at the 
Complutense University of Madrid (Spain). Among other works, he 
is the author of Economía política de los nuevos países indus-
triales asiáticos [Political Economy of the Newly Industrializing 
Asian countries), Siglo XXI Editores, Madrid, 1990, in spanish, 
and Economía del desarrollo: un análisis histórico [Development 
Economics; A Historical Analysis), Ed. Complutense, Madrid, 1991, 
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l. DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY; A THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of theories focusing on. the relationship 
between democracy and economic development in the Third World may 
be broadly divided in three main phases: the classic liberal 
modernization scbool phase; the period of the conservative rea-
ssessment and of the "bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes" 
literature; and the new focus on the appearance of authorita-
rianism, on transitions to democratic rule and on the new rela-
tionship between economic development and political freedoms in 
developing countries (1). 
The first period - broadly the 1950s and 1960s - was the 
phase of the hegemony of classic modernization theory. For its 
supporters, economic development created preconditions of 
democracy such as literacy, mass communication, income equality, 
social stability, and, above all, a middle class seeking for 
political freedoms (2). This naive belief in the inevitability 
(1) Excellent surveys are R. Higgott and R. RObison, "Theo-
ries of Development and Underdeveloproent: Implications for the 
Study of Southeast Asia", in R. Higgot and R. Robison (eds.), 
Southeast Asia. Essays in the Political Economy of Struetural 
Change, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985, pp. 16-61; S. 
Haggard, "Authoritarianism and Demoeracy: Political Institutions 
and Economie Growth Revisited", in his Pathways froro the Periphe-
ry. The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Coun-
tries, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1990, pp. 254-270 
and V. Hewitt, "Modernization is Alive and Well and Living in 
••• ", The Pacific Reyiew, vol. 4, No. 1, 1991, pp. 68-69. 
(2) See S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Prerequisites of Demo-
cracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", American 
Politieal Seience Reyiew, vol. 53, No. 1, Mareh 1959, pp. 69-105; 
G. Almond and J. S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of peveloping 
Areas, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1960 and B. 
Moore Jr., Social Origins of pjctatorship and pemoeracy: Lord and 
Peasant jn the Makjng of tbe Modern World, Beaeon Press, Boston, 
Mass., 1966. 
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of a wide diffusion of Western political values and, hence, of 
democracy (and even of development i tself) vaned as, in the 
1960s, many Third World nations began to evolve into authorita- ,. 
rian regimes (Brazil and Zaire in 1964, Indonesia and Philippines 
in 1965, ••• ) and experienced growing economic difficulties. 
The second phase - the late 60s and the 70s - was the period 
of a conservative reassessment of the liberal values of the pre-
vious decades (3). Poli tical development bagan to be seen as 
a process of creating stable (and not necessarily democratic) 
ins-titutions. Order and strong governments were even stressed 
as prerequisites of economic growth (4). 
On the other side of the poli tical spectrum, this phase also 
witnessed the appearance of a wide "bureaucratic authoritarian 
regimes" (BAR) literature, which followed the wake of early 
dependency theory, pioneered in the late fifties and in the 
sixties by P. Baran or A. G. Frank. This school stressed au-
thoritarianism's inevitability in the Third World, because of the 
political and economic requirements of dependent development. The 
"development of underdevelopment" (Frank) or the "associated 
• dependent development" (Cardoso) demanded, in a medium term, 
repression and the dismantling of the instruments of defense of 
(3) D. C. O'Brien, "Modernisation, Order and the Erosion of 
a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science 1960-1970", Dl.!1l. 
Journal of DeyelQpment Studies, vol. 8, No. 2, 1972, rep. in D. 
Lehmann (ed.), peyelopment Theory: Four Critical Studies, Frank 
Cass, London, 1979, pp. 49-76. . 
(4) S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Socjeties, 
Yale University press, New Haven, Conn., 1968. For a critical 
analysis of Huntington's work, see C. Leys, "Samuel Huntington 
and the End of Classical Modernization Theory", in H. Alavi and 
T. Shanin (eds.), Introduction tQ the Socjology of "peyelopjng 
societies", MacMillan, London, 1982, pp. 332-349. 
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the popular classes (5). Guillermo O'Oonnell even suggested 
that the "deepening" of import-substituting industrialization 
(ISI) , 1. e., the progressi ve transi tion from primary to" 
secondary lSI, was responsible for the rise of bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1960s and first 
1970s (6). The income concentration and the wages control that 
these regimes favored enabled to expand the market for consumer 
durables, which were capital and intermediate inputs-intensive, 
and to attract more investment, whether foreign or domestico 
The third phase was the result of a rejection both of con-
servative theory and BAR literature. The reassessment of the 
appearance of authoritarianism in the Third World followed a 
frontal critique of the BAR theory (7). Firstly, it was sug-
gested that military COUps d'Etat had broader aims than simply 
facilitate secondary import substitution (8). Secondly, and 
more important, the timing of industrial growth and political 
change was not as described by the BAR thesis. For example, in 
Brazil, secondary ISI began much earlier than 1964: the steel 
(5) See F. H. Cardoso, "Associated-Oependent oevelopment: 
Theoretical and Practical Implications", in A. Stepan (ed.), 
Authoritarian Brazil. Origins. Policies and Future, Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven, Conn., 1973, and P. Evans, Oependent 
Oevelopment: The Alliance of Multinational. State and Local 
Capital in Brazil, Princeton university Press, Princeton, N. J., 
1979. 
(6) G. o'Oonnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authori-
tarism: studies in south American Politics, Institute of Inter-
national Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973. 
(7) See O. H. Levine, "Paradigm Lost: Oependence to Oemo-
cracy", World POlitics, vol. XL, No. 3, April 1988, pp. 377-394. 
(8) See, for example, Y. Cohen, "Oemocracy from Above: The 
Political origins of oictatorship in Brazil" , World politics, 
vol. XL, No. 1, October 1987, pp. 30-54. 
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industry was initiated in the 1940s with the Volta Redonda 
project and the capital qoods activities were already well 
developed in the late 1950s. In addition, the 1964 .Q.Ql.U1 represen-
ted precisely a reversal of the previous import-substituting 
policies as the military regime implemented in 1964-67 a stabili-
zation programme aimed at strengthening exports (9). 
A reaction to this was to link the origins of authoritarian 
regimes in the Third World to the shift to an export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI) strategy, consecutive to the exhaustion 
of ISI caused in the first sixties by the narrowness of the do-
mestic market and the continued balance of payments difficulties. 
It was stressed that the production of manufactured goods for the 
world market required a drastic wage control, the dismantling of 
organized labor and the repression of political opposition. Fo-
cused primarily on East Asia, this school of thought linked 
directly the discipline and political quiescence of the labor 
force to the repression exerted by the State (10). 
Nevertheless, as F. Deyo has pointed out, labor discipline 
in East Asia (and most notably in Taiwan and Hong Kong) was 
mainly the result of structural factors (colonial legacy, 
inmigration, land reform, rural industrialization, ••• ) indepen-
(9) See J. Serra, "Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the 
Connection between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes", 
in D. Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarism in Latín America, 
princeton university Press, Princeton, N. J., 1979. 
(10) F. Frobel, J. Heinrichs and O" Kreye, The New Interna-
tional Diyision of Labour. Structural Unemployment in Industria-
lised Countries and Industrialisation in Deyeloping countries, 
Cambridge university Press, Cambridge, 1980 and M. Launius, "The 
State and Labor in South Korea", Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars, vol. 16, No. 4, 1984, pp. 1-21. 
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dent of the State policies (11). In addition, the beginning 
of labor repression and subordination through sta te policies 
(1949 in Taiwan, 1959 in singapore, 1961 in South Korea, 1964 in 
Brazil, o •• ) preceded the launching of EOI (1958 in Taiwan, 1965 
in singapore, 1964 in South Rorea, 1967 in Brazil, ••• ). Labor 
exclusion by the State was adopted on behalf of political con-
siderations, we11 before the shift in the economic strategy 
(12). 
The exhaustion of democracy in developing countries was 
subsequently - once the "deepening" of ISI and the launching of 
EOI theses had been rejected - linked to political and economic 
crisis of different origins and features: the economic diffi-
culties broadened the political conflicts, which were the prime 
reason for military coyps (13). 
The authoritarian regimes in Latin America had a11 disappea-
red in the mid-eighties, joining the new democracies established 
in portugal, Greece and Spain in the 1970s. The scholars' inte-
rest shifted again, away from the presumed inevitability of 
(11) F. C. Deyo, Beneath the "iracle. Labor Sybordination 
in the New Asian Indystrialism, University of California press, 
Berkeley, Ca., 1989. 
(12) F. C. Deyo, "State and Labor: Modes of Political Ex-
clusion in East Asian Development", in F. C. Deyo (ed.), Xh.e. 
POlitical Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, Cornell Uni-
versity press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1987 and F. C. Deyo, S. Haggard and 
H. Roo, "Labor in the Political Economy of East Asian Industria-
lization", Bylletin pf Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 19, No. 1, 
1987, pp. 42-53. 
(13) J. J. Linz and A. Stepan (eds.), Breakdowns of Demo-
cratic Regimes, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
Ha., 1978 and, for Brazil, H. Wallerstein, "The Collapse of De-
mocracy in Brazil: Its Economic Determinants", Latin American 
Research Reyiew, vol. XV, No. 3, 1980, pp. 3-40. 
• 8 
authoritarianism, to the features of transitions to demoeraey 
(14) • 
The issues that the researchers are now dealing with are not 
those assoeiated wi th the failure of demoeracy, as in the 60s and 
70S, but those of the failure of many authori tarian regimes. 
There is a strong tendency to go back to the early modernization 
theory, stressing again the inevitablity of democracy as the 
Third World countries develop (15). But the problem seems to 
be that succesful economic development in the Third World has 
only oecured in a handful of countries, specially in the New1y 
Industrializing Asian countries (NIACs), and most notably, in 
Taiwan. The rest of this paper will concentra te on the problems 
of democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s in an already deyeloped 
Third World country and will not comment the factors behind the 
previous extraordinary development (16). 
2. hNALOGIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TAIWbN ANO SPAIN 
This seetion summarizes some analogies between the cases of 
Taiwan and Spain, as far as the issues of economic development 
and political change are concerned. It also points out the main 
differenees that distinguish both processes. The similari ties may 
(14) See G. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead 
(eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospeets for 
oemocracy, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Ha., 
1986. 
(15) L. Diamond, J. J. Linz and S. H. Lipset (eds.), 
Democracy in oeyelQping Countries, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 
CO./Adamantine, London, six volumes, 1988-1991. 
(16) A very exhaustive review of these faetors can be found 
in C. Clark, Tajwan's Deyelopment. Impljeations for Po1jtjca1 
Economy Paradigms, Greenwood Press, New York, 1989. I have myself 
a1so e1aborate on the subject. 
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be enumerated as follows. 
Economic growth and social change 
Firstly, in both countries rapid economic growth during the 
previous decades, specially since the opening to the world eco-
nomy (1958 in Taiwan; 1959 in Spain), brought about soc~al chan-
ge. The emergence of a civil society and, in particular, of a 
growing middle class with rising political consciousness and 
expectations generated democracy claims and put pressure on the 
government. 
Taiwan has experienced extraordinary economic growth in the 
last forty years (17) in spite of unfavourable initial condi-
tions (lack of arable land and natural ressources; high popula-
tion density; split from the mainland, ••• ). This growth trans-
formed the island from an underdeveloped and low-income country 
in the fifties into a developed nation with high per capita in-
come in the eighties. Spain also achieved high growth during the 
six-ties and first seventies (18). Although its economic 
resul ts have not been as impressi ve as those of Taiwan, Spain was 
termed a Newly Industrializing Country (NIC), along with 
Portugal, Gree-ce, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Mexico, and the Far East 
four economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and singapore) in 
(17) Real GDP grew at an average of 8.8% between 1953 and 
1989. Source: Council on Economic Planning and Development, 
Taiwan statistical Data Book 1990, Taipei, 1990. 
(18) In 1950-75, per capita GNP annual growth ratas were 
5.3% in Taiwan, 5.1% in Spain, 3.2% in OECD, 2.6% in Latin 
America, 2.4% in Africa and 1.7% in South Asia. Source: D. 
Morawetz, Twenty-fiye Years of EconQmic Deyelopment, 1950 to 
J.2.1..2., A World Bank Research PUblication, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, Ma., 1977, table Al. Along with 
Greece's (5.4%), Taiwan and Spain rates were the highest in the 
tableo 
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a 1979 OECD study (19). 
In Taiwan, the high1y fluid c1ass structure that existed in' 
the 1950s, as a resu1t of the disappearance of 1and10rds conse-
cutive to land reform, of the weakness of industrial bourgeoisie 
and of popular exc1usion (20), a10ng with the high and parti-
cu1arly redistributed growth and with the widespread diffusion 
of sma11 and medium-sized entreprises, generated a broad midd1e 
class and, in Hagen Koo terms, a "predominant1y petit bourgeois 
society". 
Income per head rose rapid1y (US$ 8,000 in 1990; 10,000 if 
the underground econorny is considered). And so did 1iteracy rate 
(45% in 1952 and 92% in 1989) and the percentage of popu1ation 
with at 1east sorne higher education, which is now specia11y high 
in Taiwan (45% in Taiwan; 22% in the United Kingdom). In the 50s, 
the aid-re1iance on the U.S. favored an internationa1isation of 
out100k. The outward-orientation of the econorny since 1958 a1so 
enhanced foreign benefic inf1uences, as the dependence on in-
ternationa1 trade and the contact with other countries generated 
a new po1itica1 sofistication among taiwanese businessmen 
(21). 
(19) OECD, The Irnpact of the New1y Industrializing Countries 
on Production and Trade in Manufactures, OECD, Paris. 
(20) See H. KOO, "The Interp1ay of state, Social C1ass, and 
Wor1d System in East Asian Deve10pment: The Cases of South Korea 
and Taiwan", in F. C. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of the 
New bsian Industrialism, Cornell uni versi ty Press, Ithaca, N. Y., . 
1987, pp. 165-181. 
(21) See T. A. Metzger and R. H. Myers, "Understanding the 
Taiwan Experience: An Historica1 Perspective", The Pacific Re-
~, vol. 2, No. 4, 1989, pp. 297-311. 
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As in Spain, economic success partially legitimated the 
political system, a factor that contributes to explain why the 
period of authori tarian rule lasted so long. In the case of' 
Taiwan, this period was also prolonged because of the traditional 
chinese authoritarian political culture. Moreover, in Taiwan the 
democratic transition was delayed: the pressure for democratiza-
tion was reduced in the late 60s as the regime initiated a very 
limited transformation of the legislature since 1969, when the 
first "supplementary elections" were held. In addition, the 
taiwanese elite, marginalised by the mainlanders since the 1940s, 
was coopted into government in the late seventies, when President 
Chiang Ching-kuo indigenized the civil service (22). 
Transition from within 
A second analogy between Spain and Taiwan is that, in both 
cases, the transition toward democracy was initiated from within 
the system, as a result of the pressure exerted by the opposition 
on the regime reformists. The possibilities of political compe-
tition were created under the authoritarian regime and the tran-
sition was gradual, featured institutional stability and did not 
lead to an overloading of government structures (as in Portugal, 
Philippines, Romania, ••• ). 
In Taiwan, the government opened up, since the mid-seven-
ties, space for polí tical competi tion (23). As the interna-
(22) E. A. Winckler, "Elite Political Struggle, 1945-1985" 
in E. A. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh (eds.), contending Approaches 
to the Polítical Economy of Taiwan, East Gate/M. E. Sharpe, 
Armonk, N. Y., 1988, pp. 151-171. 
(23) See J. F. Cooper, "Political Development in Taiwan", 
in H. Chiu (ed.), China and the Taiwan Issue, Praeger, New York, 
1979, pp. 37-73, also in J. C. Hsiung (ed.), Contemporary Repu-
blic of China. The Taiwan Experience. 1950-1980, Praeger, New 
York, 1981, pp. 359-373. . 
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tiona1 position of the Repub1ic of China (ROC) dec1ined in the 
first seventies, the politica1 opposition grew. A1though i11ega1, 
it was to1erated and even participated, as "danqwai" (out of the 
party candidates) in local and general e1ections. The Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) was created in september 1986 as the main 
force in the opposition and it obtained severa1 stirring po1iti-
cal victories in the 1986 and 1989 general e1ections. In addi-
tion, the government has in recent years acce1erated the trend 
toward a ful! democracy (24): in Ju1y 1987, it lifted the 
martia1 1aw, in force since Hay 1949 (25); in January 1989, 
it 1egalised the opposition parties, a1though with certain 
conditions (respect to the Constitution, anticommunism and 
antisecessionism). In Hay 1991, the government dec1ared the end 
of the 1948 "temporary provisions" which suspended the Constitu-
tion and gave extensive emergency powers to the president during 
the period of "communist rebe11ion" in the main1and. 
In Spain, a Law of Po1itica1 Reform was enacted in 1976 by 
the Francoist Par1iament (which then commited po1itica1 suicide) 
and subsequent1y ratified in a referendum. The opposition parties 
- the Socia1ists and Communists were the main forces - were 1ega-
1ised in 1976-1977 under a government presided by a former Fran-
co's Hinister, Hr. Adolfo Suárez. Free e1ections were he1d in 
(24) See S. Long, "Politica1 Reform in Taiwan 1986-89", in 
his Taiwan: China's Last Frontier, HacMi11an, London, 1991, pp. 
180-202, T. Ling and R. H. Hyers, "Winds of Democracy: The 1989 
Taiwan Elections", Asian Suryey, vol. XXX, No. 4, April 1990, pp. 
360-379 and J. T. Dreyer, "Taiwan in 1990. Finetuning the sys-
tero", Asian Suryey, vol. XXX1, No. 1, January 1991, pp. 57-63. 
(25) For an ana1ysis of the martia1 1aw, see R. C. Kagan, 
"Martia1 Law in Taiwan", Bu11etin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 
vol. 14, No. 3, Ju1y-September 1982, pp. 48-54. 
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June 1977 (26). 
Beyond the analogies, there are also strong differences 
between Taiwan and Spain. 
The economic record 
A first difference is their economic record during the 
political transition. Taiwan experienced a continued economic 
expansion with excellent results in the external sector. Spain 
suffered a deep crisis in the mid-seventies and first eighties 
and its balance of payrnents worsened sharply. GDP annual growth 
was substantially lower in Spain between 1974 and 1984 than in 
Taiwan between 1980 and 1990 (see the table). Moreover, Taiwan 
has enjoyed a sizeable trade surplus in the 1980s (equivalent to 
more than + 20% of GDP in 1986 and 1987). Spain's trade deficit 
reached -8,1% of GDP in 1974 and remained around -5% in 1980-82. 
GDP annual growth rates during the political transition in 
Taiwan (1980-1990) and Spain (1974-1984) 
:r¡:\1l!l1l Il Sl2l:1ill 
1980 6.8 1974 5.3 
1981 5.5 1975 0.5 
1982 3.4 1976 3.3 
1983 7.7 1977 3.0 
1984 9.6 1978 1.4 
1985 4.4 1979 -0.1 
1986 10.6 1980 1.2 
1987 12.4 1981 -0.2 
1988 6.8 1982 1.2 
1989 5.7 1983 1.8 
1990 5.2 (GNP) 1984 1.8 
Sources: Asian Development Bank and Contabilidad Nacional 
de España 
(26) See P. Preston, :rhe :rriumph of pemocrl:lcy in Spl:Iin, 
Methuen, London, 1986. 
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The intensi ty of crisis in Spain was due to several factors: 
the effects of the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 in an extremely 
oil-dependent economy, a big growth in labor costs, the competi-
tiveness of Third World countries in key world markets and the 
lateness of the adjustment policy. In spain, as in many latin-
american nations, the retreat of authoritarianism was also the 
result of the regime's inability to cope with growing economic 
difficulties and of the evaporation of the economic growth that 
legitimated the authoritarian rule. 
On the contrary, Taiwan's political transition accelerated 
in a period of high economic growth (27). Moreover, the poli-
tical regime was not, in the first eighties, an obstacle to eco-
nomic restructuring so it did not retard economic development 
(28) • 
The military role 
A second difference is the much less significant role of the 
military in Taiwan. In Spain, as the regime was the product of 
a ei vil war, the army remained an important poli tical force until 
the early 80S, although not as much as in Portugal or Greece. A 
military Q.Q!.W 'was aborted in 1981. In Spain, the .QQW2, which took 
place in February 23, is called "23 F". It involved the occupa-
tion of parliament and the retainment of the government for more 
than twelve hours. On the contrary, in Taiwan, the armed forces, 
in spite of their relative strenght, did not play a major po-
( 27 ) See B • T • K • J oe i ( ed. ) , ;.¡Tjlau,ijlw!j2all,lnL-.&.iun-.:TLrr;:jaWn¡¡;s¡¡.J.,L.;' tl&,J.I..!' o¿¡n[4. 
Political Development Bnd Economic Prosperity, The Tamkang 
University, Taipei, 1989. 
(28) G. S0rensen, "Taiwan", in his Democracy, pictatorship 
Bcd Deyelopment. Economic peyelopment in Selected Regimes of the 
Third Horld, MacMillan, London, 1991 (pp. 118-144), p. 142. 
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litical role, as they did, for instance, in South Rorea or Latin 
America (29). Since the late 1950s, economic development was 
gi ven top priori ty, instead of defense and. social stabili ty , 
which were the main concerns in the early years of the ROC. The 
military began to lose influence in the Sta te while the economic 
technocrats gained it (30). In addition, the military never 
experienced open political intervent!on, as they did in many 
latinamerican countries. As Winckler and Greenhalgh put it, "the 
military has not had to intervene, partly because Taiwan has no 
effective representative institutions to suspend, and partly 
because Taiwan's broadly distributed prosperity means that there 
is little mass discontent to repress" (31). During the poli-
tical transition, military role further disminished, even if a 
former General, Mr. Hau Pei-tsun, was appointed Prime Minister 
in July 1990. Nevertheless, this gesture was interpreted more as 
a reinforcement of government authority rather than an inroad of 
the military into politics. 
(29) See H.-S. Cheng, Party-Milítary Relations in the PRC 
and Taiwan, Westview Press, Boulder, Co., 1990. For South Korea 
see J. Huer, Marching Orders. Tbe Role of the Military in South 
Korea's "Economic Miracle". 1961-1971, Greenwood Press, Westport, 
conn., 1989 and H. B. Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritaria-
nism in South Korea", World Politics, vol. XXXIX, No. 2, January 
1987, pp. 231-257. For a comparative analysis, B. Cumings, "The 
Abortive Abertura: South Korea in the Light of Latin American Ex-
perience", New Left Review, No. 173, January-February 1989, pp. 
3-32. 
(30) R. Wade, "The political System" in his Goyerning the 
Market. Economic Tbeory and tbe Role of Goyernment in East Asían 
Industrialization, Princeton university Press, princeton, N.J., 
1990, p. 246. 
(31) E. A. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, "Analytical Issues 
and Historical Episodes", in E. A. winckler and S. Greenhalgh 
(eds.), op. cit. (pp. 3-19), p. 11. 
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Slower transition 
A third difference is that, in spite of better economic 
conditions and less military pressure, Taiwan's transition to" 
democracy in the 1980s has been slower than Spain's in the 1970s. 
In Spain, les s than two years elapsed between the death of the 
head of the dictatorial state (November 1975) and the first free 
general elections (June 1977), which gave birth to a constituent 
parliament. In Taiwan, no free elections to all the seats in the 
Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly ha ve been held, since 
the lifting of martial law in July 1987. 
The reasons for what could be called "a slow transition" in 
Taiwan.seem to be related to the absence of democratic tradition, 
the good economic results, the gradual "opening" of the regime, 
and, specially, to the Leninist character of the ruling party 
(the Kuomintang or KMT) and the lateness and weakness of the 
opposi tion movements ( 32). On the contrary, Spain has expe-
rienced democracy under the Second Republic (1931-1936). Economic 
situation deteriorated sharply in the early 70s.,The Francoist 
regime was ruled by a mix of politicians and military with no 
formal organisation. opposition to Francoism was intense since 
the beginning of the dictatorship, but specially during the 
sixties and the seventies. 
In the 1920S, the KMT reorganised i tself along '. Leninist 
lines, with the help of Russian advisors (including comintern's 
agitator Mikhail Borodin) (33). The Reorganisation Conference 
(32) See T. -J. Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist 
Regime in Taiwan", Horld Politics, vol. XLI, No. 4, July 1989, 
pp. 471-499. 
(33) See R. Bedeski, State Building in Modern China: the 
Kuomintang in the Prewar Period, Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1981. 
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(January 1924) resulted in a pyramidal structure, a strong cult 
of personality and the monopoly of power, features exacerbated 
since 1949, when the KMT fled to Taiwan. Moreover, in 1950-52 a" 
party Reform purged "indisciplined" elements and tightened in-
ternal organisation. In the 1980s, the KMT constituted a stronger 
barrier to democracy than the military in South Korea or in Bra-
zil, because of its "Leninist" resistance to transform itself 
from a hegemonic to an ordinary and competitive party. 
On the other side, opposi tion to authori tarian rule in 
Taiwan has been late and weak. The absence of populism, contrary 
to the case of Latin America, and the early exclusion of labor 
force as a political partner (34) partly explain this trend. 
Moreover, the brutal suppression of the February 28, 1947 up-
rising (35) eliminated poli tical opposi tion for, at least, 
twenty years. In addition, until the early eighties, the KMT did 
not hesitate to apply the full weight of martial law to crush 
political dissent, as in the "Free China Movement" affair in 
1960, the "Taipei spring" in 1971-73, and the Kaoshiung incident 
in 1979. And the 1973 and 1979 protests were related more to 
diplomatic setbacks (ROC expulsion of the UN and Nixon's visit 
to Beijing in 1972 and U.S. recognition of PRC in 1978) than to 
strong claims of political reformo 
The elitism and organizational inability of opposition in 
(34) See S. Haggard, ob. cit., pp. 255-261 and Deyo, ~ 
~. 
(35) See G. H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 
London, 1965. 
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the sixties and seventies were also responsible for its weakness 
(36). In the 80S, the democratic movement was continuously 
wea-kened by radicalism and divided by factionalism, specially 
between those who wanted to concentrate on reform in Taiwan and 
those advocating, although implicitly, independence (37). The 
KMT's growing sofistication in electoral strategy contributed 
also to the limited success of the opposition in the mid-80s 
elections. 
3. THE TASKS AHEAD IN THE DENOGRATIZATION PROCESS 
The acceleration of political transition is one of the main 
tasks. The end of the "temporary provisions" in May 1991 ex-
pressed, besides the recognition that mainland was beyond hope 
of recovery, deep democratic intentions and paved the way into 
elections of fully democratic National Assembly and Legislative 
Yuan, as these provisions froze indefinitely in office since 1948 
all mainland-elected members of thetwo bodies. The government 
foresees that all seats in the National Assembly, the Legislati ve 
Yuan and the Control Yuan will be elected in Taiwan in late 1991, 
199~ and 1993, respectively. The opposition objects that the 
KMT's plan contemplates that the National Assembly will include 
"mainland" (and some overseas Chinese) representatives. This is 
based on the assumption that Taiwan's Assembly represents all 
China. so~e analysts assert that the claim of total sovereignty 
(36) See M. Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political 
Reforms in Taiwan. 1971-73, Center for Chinese Studies, Univer-
sity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mi., 1976 and G. Chen, nTheReform 
Movement among Intellectuals in Taiwan since 1970", Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian scholars, vol. 14, No. 3, July-September 1982, 
pp. 33-34. 
(37) C. L. Chiou, "Politics of Alienation and Polarization: 
Taiwan's Tanawai in the 1980s", Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars, vol. 18, No. 3, JUly-September 1986, pp. 16-28. 
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over a unitary China is no more than a fiction which has to be 
given up if the restructuring of the political system is to be 
conducive to full democracy. 
In addi tion, under the present si tuation, the President will 
reta in substantial emergency powers and rema in in charge of the 
National 5ecuri ty Council, which coordinates anti-subversion 
activities, and which opposition says will concentrate now on the 
independence movement and will be beyond parliamentary control. 
Moreover, the continued monopoly of television and radio by the 
ruling party expresses KMT's unfair competition in the political 
arena. And the current plan maintains indirect presidential elec-
tions, and not before 1996, when President Lee Teng-hui' s mandate 
expires (38). 
A second task is an adecuate management of the economic 
adjustment, which involves a transition to more capital-intensive 
activities, made necessary because of higher labor costs, fierce 
trade competition from newly exporting countries and environmen-
tal degradation. But the real trend is towards investment abroad 
instead of technological upgrading (39). The rising wages and 
price of land, the stricter pollution controls, the NT$ appre-
ciation, the abundance of foreign reserves (U5$ 70 billion in 
~990), the importance of small and medium-sized entreprises, the 
will to circumvent western protectionism and the attraction of 
Third World (and specially mainland China) locations are factors 
which explain the spurt in outward investment since 1985, which 
oficially reached U5$ 1.2 billion in 1990 and 750 million in 
. (~8) 5ee P. Wickenden, "Taiwan's Bridge to the Mainland", 
F¡nanc¡al Times, April 30 1991. 
(39) "Taiwan's Billions Go Abroad", International Business 
Week, 5eptember 19 1990, pp. 26-30. 
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January-March 1991, although the real amount is surely several 
times greater. 
As money goes abroad, private domestic investment is drop-
ping (-8.9% in 1990 and -6.5% in the first three months of 1991). 
Moreover, the relocation of labour-intensive production to China 
and Southeast Asia is reducing the growth of exports (1.5% in 
1990). The trade surplus is shrinking (US$ 19.0 billion in 1987 
and 12.5 billion in 1990). It was down by 26% in January-April 
1991, compared with the same period one year earlier. At the end 
of 1991, the trade deficit with Japan could surpass for the first 
time the surplus with the US (40). 
Another economic challenge is whether the financial needs 
of the recently approved US$ 300 billion infrastructure develop-
ment programme could crowd out the private sector ability to 
raise funds, specially for technological purposes, as Research 
and Oevelopment spending represented only 1.8% of GNP in 1990. 
A third concern is environmental degradation. Taiwan's in-
dustrialization has been biased towards the most heavily pollu-
ting economic activities (leather tanning, plastics, chemicals, 
petroleum refining, pesticides, ••• ). Moreover, no environmental 
protection legislation was enacted until the 1980s: for instance, 
the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) was created in 
1987 (41). The rapid demographic and industrial growth (in 
1950, there were 7m habitants and 6,000 factories; in 1990, the 
(40) P. Wickenden, "Taiwan's Trade Pattern Turns Upside 
Oown", Financial Times, June 4 1991. 
( 41) See W. Bello and S. Rosenfeld, "Taiwan •. The Making of 
an Environmental Nightmare", in their pragons in pistress. Asia' s 
Miracle Economies in Crisis, Food First Books, IFOP, San 
Francisco, Ca., 1990, pp. 195-214. 
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figures were 20m and 90,000, respectively) has al so created 
environmental problems. The long-time unregulated dumping of 
industrial, human and animal waste has polluted rivers and 
degradated the quality of water. Because of the high motor-
vehicle density (more than 500 vehicles per square km. and one 
vehicle for every two per-sons), the 2m autos and 8m motorcycles 
exhaust fumes bring about a very poor air quality: in 1989, the 
government rated Taiwan's air quality unhealthy or very unhealthy 
an average one day a week, up 50% from 1988 (42). 
A fourth task is to solve the labor problems. Since the 
lifting of martial law in 1987, the labor movement has reawa-
kened (43). First interested in economic demands (as year-end 
bonuses), the labor movement has tried, in recent years, to undo 
some heavy inheritances from the pasto It has fought to break :KMT 
and management resistance to the creation of legi timate and 
autonomous trade unions, to protest unfair practices in the 
workplace and to.change government labor policies. Big concerns 
in the new unions are the reform of labor laws, which place too 
many conditions on the right to strike and do not contemplate 
eno\lgh sanctions on unfair labor practices, and the end of 
govElrnment's imposition of public order laws on union activities, 
. which have resulted in the prosecution of some union leaders and 
activists (44). 
(42) "The 'Beautiful Island' is Choking on Its Own Wealth", 
Internatlonal Business Week, September 17 1990, p. 29 and "Po-
llution in Taiwan. Filthy Rich", The Economist, July 15 1989, p. 
57. 
(43) S.-Y. Ho, Taiwan - After a Long Silence. The Emerging 
New Unions of Taiwan, Asia Monitor Research center, Hong Kong, 
1990. 
(44) Asian Labour Update, No. 3, August-October 1990. 
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Finally, an adecuate treatment of welfare issues is urgent. 
The urban overcrowding, the strained infrastructure, the wor-
sening of income distribution in the 80s' (45), ••• , are the' 
other side of an ultra-rapid growth, which has neglected the 
li ving standards. The plan to revamp the infrastructure, approved 
in January 1991, is directed not only to stimulate growth but 
also to expand airports, pUblic housing, transi t services, roads, 
phones and environmental facilities, in order to rise 75% per-
capita income (to US$ 14,000) by the end of the decade (46). 
5. SOME LESSONS OF THE SPAMISH EXPERIENCE 
Spain's polítical transition has provedto be, in historical 
perspective, very succesful. Despite the enormous handicaps the 
country dragged in the early seventies (the inheritances of a re-
latively recent civil war, serious economic problems, acute so-
cial and regional unrest, persistent terrorism, ••• ), Spain mana-
ged to carry out a peaceful transition toward democracy without 
significant social costs. 
This successful transition was made possible because of the 
negociating will of both government and opposition on broad po-
lítical issues (as constitutionalreform) and even on economic 
matters. The new Constitution was massively ratified in a 1978 
referendum, with the backing of a11 big parties. In October 1977, 
(45) Between 1978 and 1986, the ratio of the highest 20% 
income group to the lowest 20% grew from 4.18 to 4.60. Source: 
S. Long, Taiwan to 1993. Polítics Versus Prosperity, special 
Report No. 1159, The Economist Intelligence unit, London, 1989, 
p. 54. 
(46) "Rebuilding a Tiger: Who'l1 get the Lion's Share?", 
International Business Week, March 25, 1991, pp. 20-22. 
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an economic agreement (called the "Moncloa Pact") was reached. 
The unions and the parties of the Left accepted some wage aus-
terity and assured social peace in return of a tax reform and the" 
growth of social and welfare public expenditures. This consensus 
enabled the government to maintain a steady and solid path to-
wards full democracy and to reduce the economic threats on po-
litical stability. 
Besides the consensus, Spain's case also highlights that the 
prolongation of authoritarianism intensified economic difficul-
ties. Before the first free general elections, the government was 
unable to cope with growing labor and social discontent. Its 
economic policy was then simply compensatory, trying not to add 
economic problems to political ones. In the wake of the 1973 oil 
shock, the authorities decided to transfer only a small part of 
oH cost increases to the final price of oH by-products. Between 
1973 and 1978, the cost of imported oil multiplied by 5.3. In the 
same period, fuel-oil price augmented only 2.6 times. The use of 
energy was subventioned and the energy consumption (relative to 
GDP) increased in Spain while it decreased in other OECD coun-
tries. In addition, fiscal and monetary pOlicies were timid and 
the government lacked a stabilization will. As a result, infla-
tion (40% in mid-1977, on an annual basis) and external deficit 
(US$ 5 billion) grew to high proportions until the end of 1977. 
Another lesson is that the weakness and internal dissents 
of the ruling party (the Democratic Center union) between 1977 
and 1982 aggravated the economic problems. The government was 
unable to initiate an energy policy until 1979 and an industrial 
policy until 1981, at least five years later than the rest of 
Europe. This mantained a highly inefficient energy sector and 
intensified the industrial crisis. Moreover, a military ~ was 
organised in 1981 and, although it was rapidly desactivated, it 
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clearly expressed the government's weakness and lack of informa-
tion. 
Although the differences between the two cases cannot be 
overlooked, Taiwan's transition to democracy could get sorne ins-
piration from the Spanish process. The importance of political 
and economic consensus in the path to full democracy and the pro-
blems associated to a delayed and extended transition are proba-
bly the two main lessons from the spanish political experience. 
